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.Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the politicization of ethnic sentiments in Thailand with particular focus 
on Southern Thailand. It is divided into six parts. The first part examines the relationship 
between the Thailand’s political system and the minority groups within it. The second part 
explains the impact of ethnic politics in the Thailand’s political system. The third part 
discusses the function of ethnic politics. The fourth part examines the organizational base of 
ethnic politics in the region. The fifth part discusses the patterns of ethnic politics that have 
developed over the years. And the sixth part synthesizes the theories and practices of ethnic 
politics in the region.  The data for this analysis came from both primary and secondary 
sources. The study found that the politicization of ethnic sentiment was by product of 
structural inequalities in the socio-political and economic domains of the Thailand’s society 
which play important role in intensifying conflicts. As a result, the Malay Muslims ethnic 
group established their own ethnic associations or organizations which are responsible for 
the development of strong group identification leading to the emergence of secessionist 
groups in  Southern Thailand that threaten the core values of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is seldom to find example of a more timely or relevant study than the one we offer the 
reader in the following pages. Our subject is one for which the reader can find illustrations 
from each day‟s newspapers and political discussions. We hope that this analysis will help 
the reader in understanding the most acute decades old domestic problem that the Kingdom 
of Thailand‟s society confronts today. 
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 In the 1980s and 1990s there was relative peace and stability in the region under 
General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988).
1
 As a result, many analysts and leaders of both the 
Malay Muslims and the Buddhist-Siamese people erroneously thought they were about to 
close the chapter of ethnic/religious politics in Southern Thailand from politics to history, as 
something of the past, when they all thought that the melting pot or integration had made 
remarkable progress towards its goal, where the Malay Muslims were assured of their cultural 
and religious freedoms and rebels were given general amnesty that would lead to the co-
existence of ethnically divided society. 
However, as the failure of the policy of national integration or Thesaphiban and 
Thainess or Khwamphethai displays a surprising persistence of discord and tension in the 
Kingdom of Thailand, in general and, in Southern Thailand in particular.  In this respect, 
Philips reveals it as one of the great unfinished tasks of nation-building the Bangkok 
government must pay attention to with urgency:  
 
In the most general terms, the people of Bang Chan are like almost all ethnic 
Thai peasants (excepting on some counts Thai Moslems and some of the 
economically disenfranchised people of the Northeast)in that they have a keen 
sense of membership in the nation-state with a deep loyalty to the Crown, 
speak the Thai language, are Theravada Buddhists, are outwardly highly 
deferential to the authority of the Central government, and have a conception 
of the good life that stresses fun, physical comfort and security.
2
 
 
 The distinctions that men make may be drawn along regional, economic, 
occupational, and ideological lines; they may involve clearly defined material and 
psychological interests which we readily identify as “political”.3 Among the common 
distinctions that have brought men together are those which we designate as “ethnic” that is, 
those distinctions based on race, tribe, religion, language and other broadly defined cultural 
attributes. If we look outside Thailand, the bonds of blood and faith in most of the world 
strongly define political interest and conflict, thereby aggravating the fissures, and fortifying 
the fusions, that obtain in the polity. Such bond has natural and universal character as 
discussed in Ibn Khaldun‟s “theory of assabiyah.” On the other hand, sometimes, they cut 
across such divisions and provide unity where none seemed possible. This is natural since 
affiliation, not only would ensure one‟s protection and safety, but also provide an avenue of 
respect and recognition from other existing ethnic groupings.  
 Ethnic politics should not be viewed as a parochial phenomenon, for there are few 
places on earth, developed or underdeveloped, where ethnicity is not presently of political 
significance. Even if we confine our attention to these distinctions that exist principally 
within national boundaries and say nothing of the usual animosity between nations, we are 
left with an imposing list. For instance, Bangsamoro versus Christian Filipino; Singhalese 
versus Tamil, Achenese versus Javanese, Tibetan versus Chinese, Turk versus Greek Cypriot, 
Arab versus  Jew; Christian versus Jew; Muslim versus Christian; Protestant versus Catholic; 
and so on. This list merely scratches the surface. This is more particularly true of Southeast 
Asian region, in general, and the Philippines, in particular. 
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 The Kingdom of Thailand is a cultural, linguistic and religious conglomeration, a fact 
that has led its polity to experience some share of ethnic politics. This paper is an 
investigation of that kind of politics in Thailand, in general, and Southern Thailand, in 
particular. It purports to be neither an exhaustive compendium of every study on the topic nor 
a historical account of every ethnic group that has ever expressed a political need or desire in 
this country. We are not motivated in this study by any intent to demonstrate the desirability 
or undesirability of ethnic politics. The primary questions guiding us are: what have been the 
impacts, styles, and conditions of ethnic political behavior? In other words, how can we best 
describe and account for ethnic politics and locate the causes and consequences of such 
politics? The key factors in the analysis of such questions appear to be the following: 
 
1. The Thai socio-cultural system and how does it orchestrate and provide a means for 
the inculcation and achievement of ethnic values, beliefs, and symbols.  
2. What are the components of ethnic politics and what basic patterns dominate? 
3. What are the pervasive consequences of ethnic politics for the functioning of the Thai 
political system? 
4. How do the values, predispositions, and social positions of ethnic members and 
groups influence the varieties of ethnic politics in the region? 
 
The Factor of Ethnicity 
 
Before attempting to assess the impact of ethnic politics in Southern Thailand, we must direct 
our attention to the relationship between the Thai political system and the minority groups 
that are part of it. First, it must be noted that the number of minority groups viable in the Thai 
society is extensive. However, for the purpose of this paper only a few will be discussed as 
they have, over the years, had the most obvious effect on the Thai political system. 
 Next, we must ask such questions as: Is the Thai socio-cultural system a unique blend 
of the multifarious groups that compose it, as the melting pot thesis argues? Or is this society 
really less a blend than a patchwork of ethnicity, held together by the necessary minimum of 
common loyalties but retaining more or less distinct sub-cultural groupings, as the cultural 
pluralism thesis would have it? Or should one speak of a dominant Siamese-Buddhist core 
socio-cultural system, in which ethnic groups enjoy more or less marginal status? Analysts of 
the Thai society have adhered firmly to one or the other of these ostensibly mutually 
exclusive models. Here we will briefly examine all three.  
 
The Melting Pot 
 
In the early 1930s when the government‟s institutionalized, patronized and developed a top-
down policy of nation-building which emphasized Thainess known as Khwamphenthai
4
   and 
before the cultural question had reached crisis point, some educated and secular urbanites 
conceived of the congested cultures of Thailand as a bubbling melting pot that would 
eventually simmer into an invigorated and uniquely Thai product. For some groups the pot 
would understandably bubble more slowly. The Malay Muslims, for instance, would retain 
distinctions in language, custom, and religion, but only for some time. Whatever the varying 
rates of assimilation, however, most marginal groups eventually will disappear and merge 
                                                 
4
 Ahmad Amir Bin Abdullah, “Southern Thailand: Some Grievances of the Patani Malays,” The Journal of 
International Studies, Vol, 4, 2008, 105. 
  4 
into the larger Thai cultural totality. These were the basic assumptions held by these groups 
of optimists which time has ever since invalidated. 
 
Cultural Pluralism 
 
History and the passing of time and the intensive and extensive rural-urban mobility have 
diminished ethnic uniqueness, but what is striking, some argue, is not the scope and rapidity 
of assimilation, but rather the persistence of unassimilated ethnic identities of the Thai 
society. To this school of thought the melting pot has never eradicated ethnic politics in the 
country. To these elements, Thailand still retains rather clear, long-standing ethnic 
distinctions which are operative in the country‟s social and political life, and which show, 
every evidence of persisting. 
Rather than a melting pot, Thailand is a patchwork of ethnic enclaves. The dominance of 
the Buddhist-Siamese culture should not force us to overlook the great variety of sub-cultures 
and sub-communities, and minority group ties that still exist. Some argue such proponents of 
cultural pluralism as Muslim traditional politicians, who consider Thailand to be a democracy 
of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Thailand, in 
the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their own kind. 
Such has been the official stance of Malay Muslim politicians within the political 
establishment of the Thailand with respect to the issue of Southern Thailand problem.  
During the regime of General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988), there was concerted effort 
to accommodate and pacify the Malay Muslims through assuring the Malay Muslims of their 
cultural and religious freedoms- plus economic development for the south through National 
Security for the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC). Amir argued 
that SBPAC was formulated based on the concept of development as security approach.
 5
 
The failure of the Bangkok government to implement this policy effectively plus 
addressing cultural and religious sensitivities of the Malay Muslims clouded the prospect of 
attaining genuine integration (accommodation?) in the region and thus vindicated the 
separatist approach. 
 
The Core Culture 
 
In attempting to address the extent of assimilation in Thailand, one should not overlook the 
question: assimilation into what? Indeed, assimilation had started already during the kingship 
of King Chulalongkorn when he annexed other territories including territories of the 
Sultanate of Pattani. He established authority over them through administrative reforms and 
has continued up to the present. However, it was intensified during the ultra-nationalist‟s 
regime that embarked on a policy of forced assimilation of different minority groups into the 
mainstream Thainess or Khwamphenthai.
6
 The Thai government aimed to absorb the 
cultures, religions, and languages of other minorities more specifically, the Malay Muslims, 
into the dominant Siamese-Buddhist culture. The Thai government has used government 
establishments such as schools, universities, the media and so forth to carry this forward.  
However, the assimilation process was even more thorough and quick for those who 
chose to move to Bangkok in search of education and jobs. One may speak of a new blend 
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pouring from the Thai crucible or a pluralistic patchwork of ethnic cultures, but adherents of 
this school of thought have explicitly or implicitly assumed that there is a “core culture” in 
Thailand, composed of essentially Siamese-Buddhist values, life styles, and identifications, to 
which a great number of ethnic cultures- except perhaps for the South- are in some way 
related. Such is the stance of most Monk leaders who take pride in Thailand as one of the 
Buddhist countries in Southeast Asian region. 
Using language as an index of cultural diffusion (as the medium by which cultural 
forms are transmitted and social relations conducted,), one can see that Thai language is 
prevalent all over the Kingdom of Thailand. A measure of ethnic influence is found in the 
wealth of foreign words that have been osmosed into a language that remains Thai. While the 
pluralists may point to multilingual communities in Thailand, from the far north to the 
extreme south, these exceptions prove the rule: in Thailand both officially and in practice, the 
most prevailing language is Thai language. 
Furthermore, to operate acceptably in the mainstream of Thai society extending 
beyond the confines of his/her group, an ethnic group must achieve a certain minimal 
(maximal?) proficiency in and adaptation to the linguistic skills, behavioral patterns, and 
attitudinal values of the dominant Siamese-Buddhist community, as well as a certain minimal 
acceptability by that community. Indeed this school of thought presupposes a majority 
identification and standard in a core culture. 
 
Comparing the Three Approaches 
 
That all three approaches - melting pot, cultural pluralism and core culture - have enjoyed 
some currency is partly because each expresses longstanding value preferences; each claims 
not only to describe what actually is, but what ethically and ideally ought to be. Clearly, each 
approach has some political implications. The melting pot refrains and discourages the 
organization of distinctly ethnic political organizations and interest groups such as found in 
Southern Thailand and also equally true to some other parts of the country. Under this theory, 
ethnic politics is viewed as the perpetuation of divisive factions and parochialisms inimical to 
the best interests of a “united Thailand”. On the other hand, the recognition of cultural 
pluralism enhances the mosaic of groups woven into the fabric of distinct ethnic entities 
within Thailand. Cultural pluralism provides ample flexibility to the different ethnic groups 
to express their grievances and present their respective interests and preserve their cultural 
identities. It is the most viable way to guarantee peaceful co-existence among groups. 
The implications of the core culture idea are probably more subtle. In essence it 
suggests a unified political elite working for the good of the total community with the tools of 
“good government” centered in Bangkok. This theory provides broad criteria for detecting 
and curtailing the influence of “alien” politics that threaten the stability of the society. 
Radicals importing foreign ideologies and group efforts to promote ethnic pride have been 
seen as undermining the core values of Thai society.  
As might be evident, one reason why all three models may seem plausible is because 
each enjoys some kind of empirical base. For instance, there is evidence that some groups 
disappear in a larger cultural totality, and insofar as members of these groups contribute to a 
distinct Thai life, the melting pot idea has empirical support. The scattered linguistic and 
culturally autonomous ethnic communities in Thailand lend some support to the idea of 
cultural pluralism. Nevertheless, over and above such pluralism, there exist dominant and 
basic standards, values and living styles, while not free of contradictions and variations, still 
seem to represent established patterns that are far more than merely federations of quasi-
autonomous cultures, a fact that substantiates the core culture theory. 
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The Politicization of Ethnicity in Thailand 
 
In Thailand, perhaps, ethnic politics has started shortly after King Chulalongkorn‟s 
annexation of the territories of the Sultanate of Pattani through administrative act officially 
known as Thesaphiban in 1897.
7
 The Malay Muslims resisted their incorporation into the 
Kingdom of Thailand, but to no avail. For instance, the Malay Muslim expressed their 
rejection to any plan to integrate the region into the Thai-body politic.  In this sense, Nik 
Anuar Nik Mahmud argued that as early as 1940s the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand 
have been disenchanted against the Bangkok regime which led to the emergence of 
Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya (Union of Malay for Great Pattani) known as GAMPAR as 
an independence movement in Southern Thailand.
8
 Indeed, in 1948, some 250,000 Malay 
Muslims asked the United Nations to oversee accession of the Thai provinces of Pattani, 
Narathiwat and Yala to the Federated States of Malaya.
9
 
With the passage of time conflict of interests have ensued and seem no signs of 
ending soon at the time of the writing of this paper. The instituted Thai national regimes find 
themselves face to face with formidable problems of scarcity of resources and a legacy of 
distorted patterns of economic, social and political development. Competition over scarce 
resources creates antagonisms and conflicts among different groups and regions or provinces. 
Under such pressures politics for traditional political parties is reduced to retention of power, 
bringing personal gains through ability to control the process of allocation of funds and 
capital.
10
 In most cases the groups that had a head start in education and other indicators of 
modernization usually had custody over politico-military power. To the disfranchised Malay 
Muslims, independence meant a change of masters with favoritism and nepotism dominating 
the social, economic, military and political scenes in Southern Thailand, specifically, the 
provinces of Pattani, Narathiwatt and Yala. As one source aptly puts it “if political 
institutions etc. do not possess institutional integrity and appear to be in the control of 
particular religious or communal interests, these communal groups lacking power and 
position will tend to question the legitimacy of the institutional order and will be encouraged 
politically to „go in alone.”11 This is exactly what is happening in  Southern Thailand. For 
instance, the separatist movement in Southern Thailand emerged because many Malay 
Muslims turned inward, creating their own institutions to replenish social, psychological, and 
cultural values that cannot find fulfillment in the larger Thai society.
12
 As a result, distinct 
organizations and cultural practices were developed to compensate for disenchantment with 
the ongoing socio-political and cultural order.
13
 Politically, economically, culturally, and 
socially, the Malay Muslims were/are deprived and burdened with a deep feeling of socio-
economic and political inferiority and deprivation. 
On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to believe that the emerging middle 
class intelligentsia provides the cultural entrepreneurs which give ideological form to sub-
national communities.
14
 Lack of resources in the face of ever increasing demands dictates 
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claims on behalf of small regional or ethnic groups.
15
 To lobby effectively for its interests, 
such groups have to organize. The stage is set for ethnic politics. This is typically the 
situation in Thailand. 
 There are also objective factors which have made the issue of „ethnic identities‟ one 
of decided relevance to the Thai society. Most important among these are:  
 
1. Social pluralism: It is believed that more than 30 distinct ethnic groups coexist in 
Thailand. 
2. Linguistic pluralism: Together with the dominant Thai language, several additional 
vernaculars are spoken in Thailand. 
3. Religious pluralism: The people of Thailand are categorized as Buddhists, Christians, 
Muslims and Hill tribe people. 
4. Administrative boundaries: These have sometimes provided reference point for 
identification for some groups. 
 
Such factors, though important, are not sufficient by themselves to evoke ethnic 
stirrings. We should seek for other causal factors. Structural inequalities in the socio-
economic domain played an important role in intensifying conflicts and grudges.
16
  A core 
area of heavy investment was centered on the capital of the country. This part was the major 
source of the country‟s commercial production and was favored in terms of social services. 
The same unevenness was discernible in the area of communication and transportation, a fact 
necessitated by the need for efficient and profitable undertakings of the Thai royal families 
and other countries centered at Bangkok, the country‟s capital city. The same policy dictated 
similar disparities in the educational field, where the Thai administration adopted an elitist 
approach in this respect in order to supply Siamese Buddhist civil servants.  
Rather than attempting to engender balanced processes of modernization, the 
Bangkok government selected instead to nurture highly centralized modernizing patterns with 
an eye to their own needs. In the process the outlying areas of the country were neglected and 
victimized. It was natural that cities such as Bangkok and others branched out rapidly as 
commercial and industrial centers. Collateral with that development was a sustained pace of 
social and political consciousness; a bourgeois class was in the making. The uneven 
distribution of socio-political, economic and educational facilities produced relatively large 
numbers of young educated people, who later constituted an important layer in the national 
political and administrative set-up. 
 
The Khwamphethai Process 
 
What we practically have as a result of these developments was a gradual emergence of the 
“Simaese Buddhists” of the center with virtually full monopoly over economic, 
administrative and political powers in the capital city, Bangkok. The Thainess policy was 
intensified when the ultra-nationalist‟s regime took over power and embarked on a policy of 
forced assimilation of different minority groups into the mainstream Thainess or 
Khwamphenthai
17
 as pointed earlier. The Thai government aimed to absorb the cultures, 
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religions, and languages of other minorities more specifically, the Malay Muslims, into the 
dominant Siamese-Buddhist culture. The Thai government has used government 
establishments such as schools, universities, the media and so forth to carry this forward. 
The assimilation process was even more thorough and quick for those who chose to 
move to Bangkok in search of education and jobs. One may speak of a new blend pouring 
from the Thai crucible or a pluralistic patchwork of ethnic cultures, but adherents of this 
school of thought have explicitly or implicitly assumed that there is a “core culture” in 
Thailand, composed of essentially Siamese-Buddhist values, life styles, and identifications, to 
which a great number of ethnic cultures- except perhaps for the South- are in some way 
related. Such is the stance of most Monk leaders who take pride in Thailand as one of the 
Buddhist countries in Southeast Asian region. By intentionally laying the foundation for these 
structural inequalities, the Thai elites were leaving behind a ticking time bomb. They 
rendered Thailand an area of potential ethnic cleavages between the haves and the have-nots.  
However, this political development was very promising and beneficial to the 
Siamese Buddhists. They saw and considered this as their golden opportunity for their future 
political control which may lead to their dream that Thailand should a Buddhist country. 
Nevetheless, Khwamphethai was indeed, a serious blow to the Malay Muslims. It was very 
disappointing and devastating to their aspirations. The Great Kingdom Pattani (now 
provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala) was incorporated without their consent into the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the modern Thailand. Worse than that was the fact that 
the Malay Muslims were excluded from the public governance of their nation. Many Malay 
Muslims leaders resented this gross injustice, discrimination, oppression and marginalization.  
 
The Functions of Ethnic Politics 
 
Many people in Thailand have united from time to time by ethnic bonds and used politics to 
secure material goals, to satisfy psychological needs, and on occasion, to bring about 
fundamental changes in civic values. We shall now take each of these functions in more 
detail. 
 
Material Goals: Economic and Patronage  
 
Economic deprivation does explain the political pull of ethnicity. Ethnic groups, in Thailnad 
and elsewhere, have turned to politics in order to provide essential social services and 
economic advancement. Ethnicity in Southern Thailand and perhaps elsewhere, is practically 
synonymous with low socio-economic status members who occupy minority positions of 
deprivation and discrimination, their aim being to wrest material benefits and values from the 
centre. These peripheral groups knew that the dominant political groups would not 
voluntarily relinquish material values to the deprived areas at the same time these 
marginalized groups cannot live on the crumbs from the table of the dominant power holders. 
Obviously the onus of poverty, neglect and economic deprivation has led ethnics in the south 
to seek political redress throughout the political history of Thailand. 
 
Psychological Goals: the Self Esteem of the Victim 
 
Ethnics groups of Southern Thailand felt that their lack of status is due to discrimination and 
other structural inequalities designed and perpetuated by the Bangkok government. Most of 
the Malay Muslims went to the extreme of calling attention to the existence of an internal 
colonial system” which has led to resource allocation along “ethnic or religious lines.” For an 
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ethnic group‟s failure to achieve status, one could blame a discriminatory society, a society 
dominated by the Buddhist elements, who also profess Buddhism. Thus the ethnic group does 
not place the onus of poverty and material success on the individual. 
 While concerned with the pursuit of material goals as primary objective, ethnic 
politics has also stressed compensatory efforts to acquire honor, dignity, respect, and self-
esteem.  These feelings of rejection, led some to withdraw from Thai politics, cultivate 
studied apathy, and create social situations in which one was esteemed despite his ethnic 
affiliation. This was the case, for instance, with some Malay Muslims who had attained 
material success and education and opted to live in Bangkok. These are then some of the non-
political ways in which ethnics of Thailand coped with the problems of group and individual 
self-esteem. However, ethnic group members could not always resort to this sense of 
withdrawal and resignation. For the majority of ethnic groups in Southern Thailand, political 
organization provided an avenue for the stormy expression of emotions, acute resentment, 
and the longing for recognition of one‟s human worth. Politics also provided ethnic groups of 
the region with a means of seeking recognition and respect. A typical example is the 
establishment of the GAMPAR as an avenue to protect and advance the Malay Muslims 
groups in Southern Thailand. This politics of recognition and respect was in most cases a 
search for confirmation that public officials in Bangkok would listen to the marginalized 
Malay Muslims, and thus it has symbolic value to group members.  
This feeling of neglect by ethnics was perhaps behind the blunt refusal of many Malay 
Muslims groups to be part of the Thai system. Because of the lack of recognition, and 
admittedly, by way of reaction, many of the aspirants for power fell back on their ethnic and 
regional constituencies, leading to the emergence of several ethnically-based  and possibly 
ethnically-biased political movements. 
  
Civic Values as Ethnic Political Goals 
 
Ethnic political behavior has conditioned basic Siamese Buddhists civic values that are the 
root ideas about the form and content of the controversial permanent constitution of the 
country and the structure and purposes of the government itself. Such critical effects fly in the 
face of a core culture interpretation that holds inherited political values as sacrosanct and 
enduring. Three major examples will help to clarify this point:  
First, the cumulative opposition to traditional political elites and leadership group 
based on family and property. Most ethnic groups have strenuously fought against this 
monopoly of power by the privileged few, placing the problems of the country in widest 
political context and by calling for a radical restructuring of power, promotion of self-
determination, and an end to the conscious and subconscious prejudices that have marred 
Thai political life. Most leaders of ethnic political groups are drawn basically from achieved 
rather than ascriptive elites. Second, great emphasis on government as an agency of collective 
benefits and the demand for the fair distribution of wealth and opportunities. It is natural that 
a concept like class exploitation has been introduced into the main stream of Thai political 
life by the ethnics. As one scholar put it the ethnics have developed a “new liberation 
philosophy” which reflects a shift in emphasis by the underprivileged groups from purely 
political and cultural demands which characterized that movement till now, to the more 
encompassing emphasis on socio-economic and political demands. Under this new 
philosophy, it now seems crystal clear that the future of a peaceful united Philippines no 
longer rests on granting the marginalized regions and groups token and symbolic political 
powers over their local affairs, but a genuine autonomy or self-determination so as for them 
to shape their own future. Third is the vehement and mounting opposition by the Siamese 
  10 
Buddhists settlers in Southern Thailand against any Bangkok government‟s offer to grant 
self-determination to the people in Southern Thailand.  
 
 
The Organizational Base of the Thai Ethnic Politics  
 
If ethnic politics is based on strong group identification, then it is ethnic associations which 
are responsible for the initial development of these identifications. The first political impact 
of marginalized areas and groups was channeled through diverse fraternal societies based on 
common ethnic ties. That initial step promoted the formation of an ethnic consciousness that 
would later burst forth into the Thai politics. Responding to the needs of uprooted 
individuals, the ethnic social associations provided renewed strength for the common ties that 
had been loosened during the struggle for independence and the phase directly following its 
attainment. Group consciousness was quickly turned into “group nationalism” and political 
loyalty. The associations and social clubs formed by ethnic groups laid the framework for 
ethnic politics in another way. The heart of the ethnic association was in the provision of 
mutual aid and welfare. That welfare was not confined to the material domain, but it was in 
certain instances of ideological nature as exemplified by the role of various groups in 
Southern Thailand.  
 So, ethnic organizations have perpetuated ethnic politics by providing identification, 
political styles, and core values for their members.
18
 However, the political impact of social 
associations based on ethnic ties was tempered by circumstances of organizational strength 
and position. Organizational resources are most readily mobilized for defensive politics, that 
is, when a basic tenet of the ethnic group, ultimately its survival, is threatened. Social clubs 
were least likely to enjoy political impact when divisive political and social policies, such as 
the promulgation of the constitution, were at issue. New and divisive political and social 
policies could only be supported by a secure and imaginative political leadership, hence the 
transformation of these ethnic associations into political parties, revolutionary groups and 
many others  serving the interests of a specific ethnic or regional constituency. The popular 
uprising of 1990s furnished that opportunity. That period witnessed the resurgence violence. 
 
The Pattern of Ethnic Politics in Thailand 
Any general effort to account for ethnicity‟s persistence in Thai politics raises the question of 
the dominant forms ethnic politics has taken. We can identify three main responses adopted 
by the various Thai ethnic groups, namely, accommodation, separatism, and radicalism. Each 
pattern represents an attempt to secure certain values under certain structural and cultural 
conditions with certain political consequences. 
Each of the three patterns is significantly influenced by the cultural framework of 
ethnicity and the availability of political institutions to express ethnic claims on the polity that 
is one ethnic group may strongly desire to accommodate itself to prevailing political styles, 
while another may have strong cultural traditions tending to keep it separate. 
The dominant politics of accommodation requires that political and economic benefits 
are available to assuage ethnic demands, and that these benefits are distributed evenly. 
Accommodation also requires the recognition on the part of power holders concerning the 
right of the underprivileged groups in power sharing. The essence of recognition politics is, 
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therefore, a psychological reconciliation of the ethnic groups to the existing political 
structure. In other words, recognition politics is a means of providing evidence that the 
political organization has honored the group and taken account of its accumulated grievances 
by symbolic mass incorporation into the governance process. As might be expected the major 
groups in the capital of Thailand to whom the reigns of power have fallen and whose culture 
has pervaded the Thai society, have been accommodated. These groups are represented by 
former Thai Foreign Minister and currently ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, 
former Royal Thai Army Chief and Council for National Security retired General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin, current head of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand Asis Pitakkumpol  
(Abdul Aziz Bin Ismail), etc. As to the marginalized groups in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala 
provinces, a few of their claims were met, the most urgent were side-stepped or given only 
symbolic recognition. As these claims were not met, either fully or at all, the other 
alternatives came into play. 
The independence movements in the Southern Thailand represent the antithesis of the 
accommodation model. Separatism occurs when an ethnic group turns inward, creating its 
own institutions to replenish social, psychological, and cultural values that cannot find 
fulfillment in the larger society.
19
 In secessionist politics, distinct organizations and cultural 
practices are developed to compensate for disenchantment with the ongoing political and 
social order. The base of political separatism is the ethnocentrism that animates ethnic group 
existence. Politics of separation is not mainly confined to Southern Thailand, but also in some 
other regions of the country. Economically and socially, the Malay Muslims are deprived and 
burdened with a deep feeling of racial inferiority, many of whom lived in desolation and 
squalor, beset by every known kind of social pathology. The corresponding reaction from 
certain groups in southern Thailand to these various forms of discrimination was armed 
violence and crises promoting separatism of the Malay Muslim homeland against the Thai 
government.  
For its part, ethnic radicalism may stress ideology because the promises of the 
existing ideologies have become hollow and redundant. The current and active violent 
secessionist movement in the south best illustrates this mode of political behavior in 
contemporary Thailand. The movement has performed an important function in dramatizing 
racial, political and religious discrimination in Thailand. According to its Manifesto the 
movement has a nation-wide goal and a definite ideological objective of socio-economic and 
political development for the whole Thailand. To conclude, the long-term dilemma is that if 
public institutions do not grant some power and recognition to deprived groups, the nihilistic 
option of violence and disorder in Thailand is unlikely to abate. 
 
 
Synthesizing the Theory and Practice of Ethnic Politics 
 
The major effort of this study has been to synthesize the theories and practices of Thai ethnic 
politics. Currently, the Thai government is engaged in a critical struggle to accommodate the 
demands of peripheral groups who are seeking a larger share in the national resources. 
Although little in these pages provides prescriptive guidelines for experts and policymakers, 
this analysis ought to at least clarify the variety of issues at stake in the present ethnic 
struggle in the region. For every ethnic group operating under given political conditions, 
particular political mechanisms will produce responses designed to award group members 
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various human values. Which one of the three models is more capable to bring peace, unity 
and prosperity to Thailand: accommodation, separatism, or radicalism? It is a question yet to 
be answered. 
 In its emphasis on divisible benefits and on the awarding of particular political 
positions to representatives of designated groups, the accommodation framework would 
accomplish several things. It would provide some necessary goods, services, and recognition 
to the minority groups struggling for survival in Southern Thailand. It would also restrain the 
divisive proliferation of class and ideological politics that would arouse public passions. By 
carefully absorbing ethnic political organizations and their leaders, while providing mass 
recognition and services, it would promote a genuinely liberal social policy within the 
framework of generally conservative religious and nationality attitudes. By recognizing the 
existence and claims of discernible ethnic groups, accommodation politics would infuse 
considerable stability into Thai political system. Founded as it is on the rapport between the 
centre and its autonomous region, accommodation politics is suited to handle mass collective 
claims for the Malay Muslims self-determination so as to shape their socio-economic and 
political destination within the framework of Thai integrity. The essence of accommodation 
politics and ethnic “recognition” is an underlying consensus on the enduring stability of 
pluralistic politics. By channeling discontent into legitimate political forms, accommodation 
politics could reduce the level of political tension, the importance of political ideology, and 
the excesses of political passion. 
 Separatism, the antithesis of accommodation, is the popular choice of many ethnic 
groups in Southern Thailand at the present time. In the absence of pragmatic accommodation 
politics, separatist tendencies have developed and ethnic political drives are converted into 
social and psychological forms as group members further withdraw from the dominant 
political system in order to find a stronger foundation for cultural and personal identity. This 
development (feeling of withdrawal from the Thai system) is a real and imminent threat to 
the Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. It seems reasonable to assume that the question 
of separation arises in the minds of many Malay Muslims from time to time, to deal with 
“Bangkok intransigence.” Yet another approach based on radical politics that is best 
represented by the current active violent secessionist movement is gaining ground. It believes 
in the transformational method to radically restructure the political process in Southern 
Thailand by using violent methods such as bombing etc.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the light of the above analysis one really wonders whether separatist and radical politics 
would have arisen in the first place in Southern Thailand, had there been an elaborate 
accommodation system operative in the country that takes into consideration the legitimate 
grievances of the marginalized Malay Muslims people. In this respect, it is therefore 
important to recognize that the Bangkok government must accommodate urgently the 
grievances of the marginalized and oppressed Malay Muslim people through granting them 
meaningful, substantive and responsive self-government in Southern Thailand.  
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